Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 23

6-2020

Real You Meets Virtual You: It is Time for Consumers to Regain
Power Online
Neeka Hodaie
hodaien@seattleu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
Law and Politics Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hodaie, Neeka (2020) "Real You Meets Virtual You: It is Time for Consumers to Regain Power Online,"
Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 18: Iss. 2, Article 23.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol18/iss2/23

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

647

Real You Meets Virtual You: It is Time for
Consumers to Regain Power Online
Neeka Hodaie*
“This is surveillance and these stockpiles of data serve only to
make rich the companies that collect them. This should make us
uncomfortable.”1
– Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, speaking at a privacy
conference in Brussels during which he announced, “we
at Apple are in full support of a comprehensive federal
privacy law in the United States.”2

I. Introduction
Everyday, our movements online are recorded, analyzed, and used to
generate immediate and future profit. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis published their influential article, The Right to Privacy, in 1890, “in
response to invasions of personal privacy caused by the technological
advances of newspapers and photographs.”3 In our current era, the right to
privacy may be more appropriately characterized as “knowing what data is
being collected and what is happening to it, having choices about how it is
*

J.D. Candidate 2020, Seattle University School of Law. Since the start of my law school
experience, I have met many inspiring people in the ever-changing privacy and data
security Space – I am so fortunate to have such great mentors who continuously inspire
me. Thank you to the SJSJ team for the thoughtful feedback on this piece. And a sincere
thank you to my family and friends for all their kind encouragement.
1
Natalia Drozdiak and Stephanie Bodoni, ‘This is Surveillance.’ Apple CEO Tim Cook
Slams Tech Rivals Over Data Collection, TIME (Oct. 24, 2018), http://time.com/
5433499/tim-cook-apple-data-privacy [http://perma.cc/6GQB-EQF3].
2
James Vincent, Tim Cook Warns of ‘Data-Industrial Complex’ in Call For
Comprehensive US Privacy Laws, THE VERGE (Oct. 24, 2018, 05:08am),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/24/18017842/tim-cook-data-privacy-laws-us-speechbrussels [http://perma.cc/BXS8-5HAZ].
3
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 195, 5
(1890).
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collected and used, and being confident that it is secure.”4 There is an entire
industry around tracking and collecting usage of online platforms. 5 Invasive,
constant, and unknown data collection has created comprehensive online
identities for every individual user.6 Generally, the actual individual attached
to the online identity that has been stitched together by data collection
practices is largely in the dark about their virtual identity. 7 Therefore,
individuals who are not even aware of these identities are in no position to be
aware of who has access to their comprehensive virtual identity.8 Businesses
are neither encouraging individuals to get to know their online identities, nor
are they making accessible the relevant information that is necessary to
manage these identities.9 Our virtual identity is a product of our likes,
dislikes, and personal demographics.10 When consumers are online, the
physical cues that alert us that our privacy could be compromised are
absent.11 As technology advances, data collection will continue to grow in

4

Alison M. Cheperdak, Double Trouble: Why Two Internet Privacy Enforcement
Agencies Are Not Better Than One for Businesses or Consumers, 70 FED. COMMUN. L.J.
261, 263 (2018).
5
Corporations use third party companies to collect and analyze consumer information.
See Morgan Hochheiser, The Truth behind Data Collection and Analysis, 32 J. MARSHALL
J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 32, 33 (2016).
6
Creepy or Cool?: Staying on the Right Side of the Consumer Privacy Line, KPMG 17
(2016),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/11/creepy-or-cool.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48VL-RZME] (providing that one leading data broker says it has
information on 700 million consumers worldwide and over 3,000 propensities for nearly
every US consumer).
7
See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Online Tracking and Behavioral Profiling,
EPIC,
https://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online-tracking/ [https://perma.cc/24WM-U85B].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Jason Morris and Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN BUS.
(Aug. 23, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/index.html
[https://perma.cc/D32T-K386] (Acxiom CEO discussing how companies are trying to
become intelligent about what consumers might be interested in and who they are).
11
Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 120 PENN ST.
L. REV. 777, 785 (2016).
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sophistication, and our online interactions and movements will face an
intensified threat.12
In a 2016 survey, eighty-one percent of U.S. respondents stated they “felt
that they had lost control over the way their personal data is collected and
used.”13 Innovative technology has developed rapidly, making data collection
more proficient and intrusive than ever, so the consumer’s knowledge of
these processes has increasingly fallen behind. While the advancement of
technology brings significant benefits for society, our relationship with the
internet has changed.
As Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple, said, “technology’s potential is and
always must be rooted in the faith people have in it.”14 It has become a
necessity in our everyday lives. Many essential goods and services are
transitioning to online platforms, often exclusively. Online transactions have
become extremely efficient, saving time, and often resulting in cost savings.
As online transactions increase, the online identities stitched together by our
data also become more fully formed. The more a consumer interacts with
platforms, the more data is available to be collected about them. Often, online
transactions required the consumer to share sensitive information, such as
credit card information and an address for shipping and billing.15 As our
levels of connectivity increase, so do opportunities for “every object to serve
as continuous surveillance equipment that monitors and collects data about
us.”16
12

See Kenneth M. Siegel, Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate Asset: Electronic
Data, Identity Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data Security in the
Information Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 822 (2007).
13
Gina Pingitore, Vikram Rao, Kristen Cavallaro, and Kruttika Dwivedi, To Share or Not
to Share: What Consumers Really Think About Sharing Their Personal Information,
DELOITTE (Sep. 5, 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/retaildistribution/sharing-personal-information-consumer-privacy-concerns.html
[http://perma.cc/5UUN-HTKA].
14
Vincent, supra note 2.
15
Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1369, 1379 (2017).
16
Id.
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All of the newly established conveniences in our lives, brought to us by
the advancement of technologies, come at a price most consumers do not
understand.17 The rapidly changing and innovative nature of online platforms
has distracted consumers from gaining a real understanding of what is going
on behind the scenes.18 As technology becomes more precise, the practice
and industry built upon snooping on people’s daily habits has spread and
grown more intrusive.19
There is often a great deal of time between when an individual loses their
privacy and when that individual realizes the implications of that loss and
demands action.20 Currently, the delay in this understanding has created data
sets that are extremely comprehensive and valuable, but which are created by
a lack of consumer awareness. Businesses are reaping substantial profits from
consumers’ oblivious use of platforms.21 There is an immense market
incentive to collect, buy, and sell consumer data; for example, sales from
location-targeted advertising reached an estimated $21 billion in 2019.22
Although consumers certainly benefit from online platforms, and even data
collection, such as relevant advertising and free content, the marketplace is
better off when consumers are informed about their transactions. How data
is collected, processed, and shared is intricate and does not result in a system
that an average consumer genuinely understands.23
17

Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056
(2004).
18
See Id.
19
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller, and Aaron Krolik,
Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/
location-data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.cc/JW93-GN5K].
20
Jay Stanley, Why Today’s Privacy-Invading Online Ecosystem May Not Last, ACLU
(May 31, 2016, 12:30PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internetprivacy/why-todays-privacy-invading-online-ecosystem-may-not-last
[http://perma.cc/C2Y8-68Q7].
21
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 2128 (discussing how technology is commodifying personal
information).
22
Devries, supra note 19.
23
Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 7.
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Acxiom, a large data broker, has “approximately 23,000 servers
scrutinizing the data of millions of individuals.”24 Once data brokers obtain
consumer data, they transfer this information to unaffiliated parties.25
Acxiom CEO Scott Howe says the company’s clients range from small
businesses to large Fortune 500 companies.26 As discussed above, consumers
are continually exposing sensitive personal information to businesses online.
Consequently, the potential for security risks is substantial. Another 2016
survey found that sixty-four percent of Americans have personally
experienced a significant data breach.27 In light of these countless devastating
and wide-ranging data breaches,28 consumers have started to demand better
practices from businesses actively.29 For instance, studies indicate that
consumers desire greater protection and security concerning their data, “but
they are also more willing to provide their personal information if companies
are transparent about how they intend to use it, allow consumers to easily
opt-out of sharing, and provide brief and readily understandable privacy
policies and agreements.”30
Faced with this consumer climate, Congress should pass a law, preempting state laws, providing that the consumer must actively “opt-in” for
companies to have permission to use the consumer’s data and directly market
to them, in lieu of the current system in which a consumer is opted-in until
that they expressly “opt-out.” After a consumer provides “opt-in” consent,
24

Elvy, supra note 15, at 1372.
Id.
26
Morris, supra note 10.
27
Elvy, supra note 15, at 1381.
28
Equifax breach exposed information such as full names, birthdates, Social Security
numbers, credit card numbers, and driver’s license numbers. See Thomas G. Jr.
Siracusa, The Equifax Breach: What We Learned and How We Can Protect Consumer
Data, 30 LOY. CONS. L. REV. 460 (2018).
29
Kevin Cochrane, To Regain Consumers’ Trust, Marketers Need Transparent Data
Practices, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 13, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/06/to-regainconsumers-trust-marketers-need-transparent-data-practices
[https://perma.cc/YZX9HFK5].
30
Pingitore, supra note 13.
25
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they are sent a standardized email indicating all the information that the
company has about the user, explaining how the data will be used, and
containing a URL link that directs the system to forget the user’s information
at any time.
This article thus outlines a plan of action to implement a federal data
privacy regulation that will deliver protections for consumers concerning
data collection, in hopes of empowering consumers and providing a sense of
ownership over their data. Online identities are becoming more
comprehensive and intrusive every day, and action to give consumers more
power in the data privacy realm is overdue. The protections proposed in this
article are necessary due in large part to the highly unequal bargaining power
and level of sophistication that surrounds transactions between businesses
and individual consumers. Generally, consumers are uninformed regarding
data collection and the technology tracking their behavior across platforms
to create a sophisticated profile curated to their preferences and habits.
Crucially, this regulation will create a market that empowers consumers to
take control and become better informed about their online privacy.
Consumers cannot begin to comprehend data collection transactions as they
are today because the setting in which they take place is mostly invisible and
overly complicated. In the future, there should be a trend permitting
consumers full visibility of their personal data and how it is monetized.31 This
regulation should aim to make the personal data market more transparent for
consumers so that they can make informed decisions about transactions into
which they enter and the situations in which they provide consent that allows
for their sensitive information to be shared.
This article first introduces the concept of data privacy and the current
setting that makes the enactment of federal legislation so crucial. Second, it
compares and contrasts opt-in versus opt-out settings, which are generally
the two default consumer consent models in the data industry. Third, it
31

Cochrane, supra note 29.
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addresses existing United States internet privacy laws and enforcement, and
then compares it with the European Union’s hefty privacy schemata that was
recently implemented, the General Data Protection Regulation.32 It should be
noted at the outset that this article is primarily focused on the regulation of
data collection from the beginning of the data transaction. Fourth, this article
describes and proposes possible solutions for the necessary components of a
comprehensive privacy law in the United States. Lastly, this article addresses
various counter-arguments to the recommendations made in this article.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Data Collection and Sharing
The monetary value of personal data is continuing to grow, and corporate
America is insistent on profiting from it.33 The Economist magazine stated in
2017 that “the world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data.” 34
Due to the rising value of consumers’ personal data, businesses now view
such data as a corporate asset.35 They, therefore, have worked hard to invest
in software that facilitates the most efficient collection of this information. 36
For example, in 2000, when internet toy retailer Toysmart went bankrupt, it
planned to sell its customer database to pay back creditors. 37 In light of
32

EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L
119/1 [hereinafter GDPR].
33
Schwartz, supra note 17.
34
Regulating the Internet Giants: The World’s Most Valuable Resource is no Longer Oil,
But Data, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/
21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuableresource [http://perma.cc/3TEN-2P8C].
35
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 2057.
36
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 2057.
37
See FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC (D. Mass. July 21, 2000). “Customer data collected
under a privacy agreement should not be auctioned off to the highest bidder,” according to
Jodie Bernstein, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.” FTC Announces
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increasing sophistication of consumer data collection, an emphasis has been
placed on informational privacy, which is concerned with the use, transfer,
and processing of the personal data generated in daily life. 38 Significant
asymmetry of information exists in online transactions, and thus an
imbalance of power results between data collectors and the subjects of the
collection. Further combined with the “systemic disadvantage and the
relative vulnerability of consumers” in that market, this culminates in a
situation where consumers are not in an ideal position. 39
Data collection through acquisition is a growing cause for concern.
Mergers and acquisitions are taking place with the target of strengthening
data sets, and once this data is acquired, it can put a given company in an
“unassailable position.”40 Recently, competition regulators around the world
have become very interested in the data that large tech companies collect,
store, and analyze.41 A letter from a dozen State Attorneys General to the
FTC state concerns about “possible long-term anticompetitive harms arising
from the aggregation of ‘big data’ by a small number of dominant
platforms.”42 Acquisitions in digital markets pose risks because of the
difficulty in comprehending the future capabilities and harm that could result
from combining data sets. There are many strategic rationales for acquisitions
aimed almost entirely at the target’s data asset, such as combining data sets

Settlement with Bankrupct Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy
Violations, FTC (July 21, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/07/
ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toysmartcom-regarding
[https://perma.cc/AA5H-DDND].
38
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 2058.
39
Id. at 2078.
40
David Meyer, The Privacy and Antitrust Worlds are Starting to Cross Over, IAPP (Apr.
23, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-privacy-and-antitrust-worlds-are-starting-to-crossover/ [https://perma.cc/7E9U-5VUT].
41
Id.
42
Letter from 12 State Attorney Generals to Donald S. Clark, Sec. of Comm’n, FTC (Oct.
10, 2018), available at
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/10.10.2018-multistate-ag-letterftc-re-hearings.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAU4-69UA].
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to create more comprehensive profiles on consumers to then sell for
advertising or using the data to develop technologies in a market. In the
advertising space, the attractiveness and value of a company increase with
the amount and detail of user data.43 The State Attorneys General voiced that
[a]lthough accumulation of data may generally be procompetitive,
there is concern that the immense advantages certain firms have in
consumers’ data – amplified by network effects attendant to such
accumulations – may effectively block new entry or expansion,
thereby limiting choice and, in some cases, harming competition.
Dominant firms often acquire potential challengers before they
become a threat. Some entrepreneurs may feel they have no choice
but to sell or close.”44
For example, Google has recently sought to acquire Fitbit, despite Fitbit’s
declining share price, for $2.1 billion. 45 Fitbit has amassed the data of over
twenty-eight million users—not to mention the established relationships it
has with key stakeholders and corporations in the healthcare sector. 46 The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia stated that “records that once
would have revealed a few scattered tiles of information about a person now
reveal an entire mosaic-a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the
person’s life.”47 Moreover, under current practices, consent legitimizes
nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data. 48

43

Bundeskartellam (Germany’s National Competition Regulator), Bundeskartellamt
Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different Sources (July 2, 2019),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_
02_2019_Facebook.html?nn=3591568 [https://perma.cc/3H3N-8YMZ].
44
Letter from 12 State Attorney Generals, supra note 41, at 4.
45
Bridget Diakun, Google’s Acquisition of FitBit Proves that Data is King, LEXOLOGY
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ceb8aaa5-f9b0-487fa50d-3b6cf59f5b01 [https://perma.cc/T7HZ-FRBL].
46
Id.
47
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800
F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
48
Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1880 (2013).
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Platforms boast about the detailed information they have on the millions
of people in their databases to gain business. Focus USA’s website states that
it has detailed information on 203 million people and over 100 targeted
mailing lists, such as “Big-Spending Parents,” “First Time Credit Card
Holders,” “Grown But Still At Home,” and “Hi-Tech Seniors.”49 These types
of databases contain data about age, gender, income, children, internet
connections, and more.50 Another database, “Hippo Direct, markets lists of
people suffering from ‘medical maladies,’ such as constipation, cancer,
diabetes, heart disease, impotence, migraines, and more.”51
Web pages are no longer static; user clicks are captured, recorded, and
monetized—leading to the creation of comprehensive consumer identities
based on this information.52 As aspects of our lives increasingly move to
online platforms, a “permanent record of unparalleled pervasiveness and
depth” is created.53 Operators of online platforms generally gather data about
what users are doing on their websites; however, some operators also collect
data about what the users are doing on other websites through tracking
tools.54 It is possible to monetize all of this personal data in various ways,
including targeted advertisements or even sales to hedge funds seeking
insights into consumer behavior55—and this is all largely unbeknownst to the
users that provided it.56 Through cunning design, privacy-invasive defaults,
and take-it-or-leave-it choices, online companies encourage and steer us into

49

DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 22 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006).
50
Id. at 23.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 26.
54
Adam Schwartz et al., New Rules to Protect Data Privacy: Where to Focus, What to
Avoid, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION: DEEPLINKS BLOG (July 2, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/07/new-rules-protect-data-privacy-where-focuswhat-avoid [http://perma.cc/C68N-SVCN].
55
Valentino-Devries et al., supra note 19.
56
Schwartz, supra note 53.
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sharing vast amounts of information.57 The result is significant information
asymmetry, and thus an imbalance of power; this, combined with the
“systemic disadvantage and relative vulnerability of consumers” in that
market, has resulted in a situation where consumers are not in an
advantageous position.58
B. Opt-in System Versus the Current Opt-out System
There are two central concepts regarding consent online: opt-in and optout. Opt-in requires the consumer’s express, affirmative, or explicit
consent.59 The business bears the burden of getting permission to collect data
in opt-in settings.60 Opt-out assumes that a consumer’s lack of action implies
consent.61 Here, alternatively, the burden is placed on the consumer to act.62
Currently, the vast majority of online interactions rely on an opt-out system,
meaning personal data can be collected and used according to the stated
privacy policy unless the individual takes steps to indicate otherwise
expressly.63 Opt-out systems make data collection the default, resulting in a
collection that is “duplicitous, clandestine, and often coerced.”64 For
example, the 1999 Gramm-Leach- Bliley Act allows banks to share
personally identifiable data with companies, as long as the privacy statement
reserves the right to share the data this way and gives the customer the right

57

Øyvind H. Kaldestad and Finn Myrstad, New Analysis Shows How Facebook and
Google Push Users Into Sharing Personal Data, FORBRUKERRADET (June 27, 2018),
https://www.forbrukerradet.no/side/facebook-and-google-manipulate-users-into-sharingpersonal-data/ [http://perma.cc/W894-2ATE].
58
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 2078.
59
Jay Cline, Privacy Consent Glossary, IAPP (Sep. 1, 2009), https://iapp.org/news/a/
2009-09-privacy-consent-glossary/ [http://perma.cc/7WRH-2AR5].
60
CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 181
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016).
61
Cline, supra note 58.
62
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 59, at 181.
63
SOLOVE, supra note 48, at 83-84.
64
Id. at 84.
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to opt-out—though sharing with other financial institutions and jointmarketing partners is usually exempt from having to offer that right. 65
This article will discuss consumer-friendly advantages to an opt-in choice
model over the opt-out model that is widely used today. As Jon Leibowitz, a
former Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission recommended,
companies should move to a model where “consumers ‘opt-in’ when it comes
to collecting information—especially when it comes to sharing consumer
information with third parties and sharing it across various web-based
services.”66 Moreover, privacy policies should be easy to understand and
should inform the consumer about the type of data the operator seeks to
gather, how the operator will use it, how long the operator will keep it, and
with whom the operator will share it.67 The majority of countries favor an
opt-in approach.68 The EU E-Privacy Directive, for instance, requires
affirmative consent.69 In Germany, “double opt-in” is required, meaning a
consumer has to agree to receive commercial emails by checking a box and
then again opt-in in by clicking on a link contained in the first email received
after enrollment.70 Canada’s Anti-Spam Law requires opt-in consent and, in

65

Jennifer Surane, Google Checking Accounts May Give Banks an Edge in Deposit Wars,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-1117/google-checking-accounts-may-give-banks-an-edge-in-deposit-wars
[https://perma.cc/ZC9C-MBN7].
66
Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at FTC Town Hall Meeting on
“Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting & Technology” (Nov. 1, 2007) (transcript
available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/soprivate-so-public-individuals-internet-paradox-behavioralmarketing/071031ehavior_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QTU-ZX77]).
67
See ADAM SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 53.
68
PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (2017), available at Bloomberg Law (follow “Practice
Centers” tab; then follow “Privacy and Data Security” hyperlink; then follow “Books &
Treatises” hyperlink; then follow “Privacy Law Fundamentals” hyperlink),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/privacy/pds_home/document/22601411624
[http://perma.cc/L9H3-6FL9].
69
Id.
70
Id.
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cases of noncompliance, provides for high monetary penalties as well as a
private right of action.71
Defaults are powerful and dangerous because of the existence of a large
information asymmetry between the consumers and the businesses engaged
in data collection.72 An opt-in rule forces the data processor to obtain consent
to acquire, use, and transfer personal information, and therefore works to
reduce information asymmetry problems.73 To operate on an opt-out system
is to ignore the blatant unequal power dynamics that govern information
transactions.74 A law that mandates an opt-in system would reduce this
culture of automatic data collection and the corresponding consequences.
C. Current Data Privacy Regulation
1. Data Privacy Enforcement
Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communication
Commission have the authority to regulate different aspects of the internet,
and individual U.S. states have the authority to enact and enforce their own
privacy laws despite the inherently interstate elements of online
transactions.75
The FCC regulation in this area is relatively new, but the FTC has a
longstanding history as the nation’s privacy and data security agency, having
brought over 500 enforcement actions regarding the privacy and security of
customer information.76 The FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection is
responsible for stopping unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent practices in the

71

Id.
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 2103.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Alison M. Cheperdak, Double Trouble: Why Two Internet Privacy Enforcement
Agencies Are Not Better Than One for Businesses or Consumers, 70 FED. COMMUN. L.J.
261, 264 (2018).
76
Id. at 261, 281.
72

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020

660 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

marketplace.77 Since 1998, the FTC has been the primary enforcer of privacy
protection for consumers against companies that violate their own privacy
policies.78 The FTC can issue advisory opinions, promulgate rules, conduct
investigations,

and

initiate administrative

proceedings under the FTC Act.

or judicial enforcement

79

The FTC Act80 gives the Agency two vital powers: prosecution and
collection of information.81 Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”82 A deceptive act or
practice is defined as a “material representation, omission, or practice that is
likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer’s detriment.”83 An act or practice is unfair if it “causes or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable
by consumers themselves and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or to competition.”84
Through its enforcement authority under Section 5, the FTC has taken up
the issue of privacy online without any internet privacy statute. 85 Thus, the
FTC can bring civil actions and seek injunctive remedies when it deems that
a company has broken a promise it made regarding consumer privacy,
whether it be in its privacy policy or design.86
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Although the FTC’s work has led to significant progress in internet
privacy, companies are primarily regulated based on their compliance with
their privacy policies.87 Because they have the authority to bring actions that
is limited to “unfair or deceptive practices,” action is generally only taken if
a company explicitly lies or misleads in their policies.88 Currently, the FTC’s
reach is very limited and is not adequate to protect consumers when
companies’ stated practices and policies, despite initial disclosures, are
unjust. In 2000, for example, the FTC recommended that Congress enact
legislation to ensure adequate protection of consumer privacy online because
of the proven limited success of self-regulatory efforts.89 However, Congress
has failed to pass comprehensive legislation, and thus self-regulation remains
the principal means for addressing issues of consumer privacy today. 90
Without a federal law mandating opt-in consent, companies can continue to
use opt-out systems and will not violate the unfair or deceptive act provision
as long as they did not state otherwise in their policies. Instead of giving
companies large discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable data
privacy measures, there should be objective standards for data security. 91
2. United States Regulation
Unlike the European Union, the U.S. has not enacted a general
comprehensive privacy measure. Instead, Congress has passed several
narrowly tailored statutes to address particular privacy issues. The way that
87
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88
Id.
89
Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace – A Report
to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplacefederal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HUX-U9ZK].
90
Kathryn McMahon, Tell the Smart House to Mind Its Own Business!: Maintaining
Privacy and Security in the Era of Smart Devices, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511, 2527
(2018).
91
Bannan, supra note 86.

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020

662 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

U.S. data security regulations are compartmentalized by each defined sector
is ineffective because of the interconnectivity of data and the overarching
implications of privacy on all aspects of life. 92
The Telecommunications Act is an example of a regulation in the U.S. that
mandates affirmative opt-in approval instead of passive opt-out practices.
The Act requires an opt-in consent system in scenarios where a business
seeks to use a consumer’s Customer Proprietary Network Information
(CPNI)93 for marketing purposes.94 CPNI is information that is generated as
a result of the customer’s telecommunication service.95 Before the Act, the
telecommunication industry was able to sell customers’ CPNI data to thirdparty companies for marketing purposes without the consent of the
customer.96 Initially, Congress left open the definition of what constitutes
“approval,” and so privacy and consumer advocates believed, or contended,
that approval should require express affirmative consent from the consumer,
and telecommunications companies argued that a presumption of approval
with the option to “opt-out” and withdraw consent would be sufficient.97
Later, the FCC further expanded on the Act by stating that there was
substantial evidence that an opt-out strategy would not adequately protect
customer privacy.98 The FCC reasoned that, because most customers either
do not read or do not understand carriers’ opt-out notices, providers would
have to obtain “opt-in” consent from consumers before disclosing CPNI to
third parties.99 Today, personal information, similar to CPNI data, is
92
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continuously shared and sold, which is why the opt-in system needs to
expand to provide protections to consumers outside of just the
telecommunication industry. The various devices we use every day, aside
from phones and the information they contain and log, deserve the same type
of protection as CPNI.
In contrast, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM)100 fails to include an opt-in requirement but
contains one prescribing that a valid opt-out mechanism must be included in
commercial emails that are sent.101 Therefore, the sender of a commercial
email is not required to acquire the recipients’ consent before sending the
commercial email.102 Until a recipient affirmatively opts-out of receiving
future communications, the sender may continue to send these emails to the
mailbox of the consumer.103 The FTC, Federal Communication Commission
(FCC), and other agencies enforce the Act.104 The FCC has increased its
enforcement of privacy matters.105 The email that must contain a valid optout mechanism in the CAN-SPAM Act is similar to the email requirement
that this article recommends. Companies have been able to implement a
process to make opt-out via an email link effective. The mechanisms,
therefore, already exist to fulfill the requirement that emails sent by
companies must include a link with the right to opt-out.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) regulates data sharing among
financial institutions; businesses that are engaged in banking and insuring
stocks and bonds, financial advice, and investing while protecting customer
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privacy. 106 But this Act is only applicable to financial institutions as defined
in the Act.107 Thus, financial institutions may not disclose customer nonpublic information to a non-affiliated third-party unless the institution
provides or has provided to the consumer a notice that complies with
requirements of the Act.108 An affiliate is any company that controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with another company.109 The
institution can disclose to unaffiliated third parties only if it has clearly and
conspicuously disclosed a warning to the consumer that the information they
are providing may be disclosed to third parties; the consumer is given the
opportunity, before the disclosure of such information, to elect that such
information is not disclosed; and the consumer is given an explanation of
how to exercise the option.110 Additionally, in order to share information with
a non-affiliated third party, the financial institution must have a contract in
place requiring the third party to maintain the confidentiality of the data. 111
Nevertheless, the GLBA does not sufficiently protect consumers because it
still follows an opt-out model, and thus an unfair burden is on the consumer
to affirmatively prevent companies from sharing their non-public personal
information with non-affiliated firms due to the opt-out standard.112 The optout system here continues to take the responsibility off the actors who gain
from the disclosure of data and instead puts it on the less informed party, the
customer.113 Consumer inaction implies consent, so the Act allows financial
institutions to share customers’ personal information unless a step is taken by

106

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6909 (2010).
See Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC - THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,
https://epic.org/privacy/glba/
[https://perma.cc/ZQ86-T442].
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
15 U.S.C. §6802(b)(1).
111
Supra note 106.
112
Id.
113
Id.
107

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Real You Meets Virtual You 665

the customer expressly changing the default.114 The GLBA errs on the side
of economic efficiency over consumer privacy protection. However, it still
demonstrates Congressional acknowledgment that consumers are entitled to
some level of security concerning their personal information.
In addition to the foregoing, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) is a federal law governing the collection of children’s personal
information on the internet, notably requiring parental consent for the
collection or use of any personal information of users under the age of
thirteen.115 This Act most closely resembles the legislation that this article
proposes. The existence of COPPA demonstrates that our society values the
protection of some personal information on the internet. However, the scope
of this Act is clearly limited to the regulation of commercial websites and
online services directed at children.116 While covering a more innocent and
indeed valuable population, this value needs to extend to protect everyone’s
personal information and not just that of those under thirteen. All users are at
risk of being taken advantage of or being ill-informed about the collection
and sharing of their personal information, so greater protections are needed
to cover all individuals, regardless of age.
Importantly,

COPPA

imposes

more

extensive

privacy

policy

requirements. This includes a link to the site’s privacy policy, which must be
posted in a visible place on every page where personal information is
collected and must include the contact information of the website
operators.117 In addition, it must explain the type of information that is
collected, and show information about how it will be used and whether it will
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be disclosed to third parties.118 COPPA requires opt-in consent by requiring
a website operative to obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection,
use, or disclosure of personal information from children. 119 Websites cannot
condition a child’s participation on the disclosure of more personal
information than is necessary for the activity.120 This requirement safeguards
against the potential that businesses could create deceptive loopholes that
limit user experiences on their sites and essentially create a no-other-choice
option towards sharing.121 If companies are able to limit and condition
consumers’ usage of their platforms beyond what is actually necessary to use
the site, opt-in consent becomes meaningless. Voluntary consent should
involve an actual choice from the consumer, as to whether to accept the
terms. Not being able to access the service without agreeing to certain terms
does not present a viable choice.122
Various federal laws provide very tight control over extremely limited
information.123 Each contains multiple exceptions and loopholes that limit
their effectiveness.124 Privacy law expert Joel Reidenberg notes that the laws
are “sectoral in nature, dealing with privacy in certain contexts but leaving
gap holes in others.”125 Overall, they fail to address the underlying power
relationship involved in this market and therefore are not adequate or
satisfactory in addressing today’s crucial privacy concerns. The U.S. needs a
comprehensive federal privacy law rather than numerous incremental and
fragmented laws. As Daniel J. Solove stated, “new privacy problems are not
isolated infringements, but are systematic and diffuse.”126 The current
inconsistency in privacy law regulation leads to more consumer confusion.
118
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Consumers, generally unable to understand which rules apply to their data
across various platforms, are likely to mistakenly believe that a choice
regarding their data in one area will also protect it in another. 127
3. State Legislation
Most states have enacted privacy legislation to protect citizens’ consumer
data. In June 2018, the California legislature unanimously voted into law the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the most stringent privacy
regulation in the country to date.128
The CCPA creates four basic rights for California consumers: (1) a
right to know what personal information a business has about them,
and where (by category) that personal information came from or was
sent;129 (2) a right to delete personal information that a business
collected from them;130 (3) a right to opt-out of sale of personal
information about them;131 (4) a right to receive equal service and
pricing from a business, even if they exercise their privacy rights
under the Act, but with significant exceptions.132
The Act requires notice, at or before the point of collection, of the
categories of collected data and the purposes of collection. Nevertheless, the
CCPA still does not require online services to obtain opt-in consent before
collecting personal data from users.133 Additionally, the CCPA does not
provide users with an opportunity to opt-out of collection: “[w]hen it comes
to users’ autonomy to make their own decisions about the privacy of their
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data, while notice is a start, consent is much better.”134 The California law is
sweeping because of the large scale of the State’s economy and the fact that
it is not limited in scope to entities that have physical operations in
California.135 Virtually all big tech must become compliant with the CCPA.
By passing the CCPA, California, in combination with other States’ laws
tackling data privacy, show that a privacy movement is spreading throughout
the U.S.136 The CCPA expresses consumers’ attitudes and demands for
change in the marketplace of their personal data.137 Because a federal
comprehensive privacy law should preempt the California law, it is
imperative for an equally strong law, ideally more robust and less ambiguous,
to be constructed.
Due to the shifting landscape of consumer demands for privacy online and
the emergence of various States’ privacy regulations, businesses engaged in
data collection and sharing have recently sought refuge in Congress. 138 On
one side, privacy advocates are urging Congress to look to the CCPA and the
E.U.’s General Data Protection Regulation in creating a federal
comprehensive privacy act for the U.S.139 Unsurprisingly, on the other side,
134
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businesses are opposing online privacy laws based on compliance costs,
expensive penalties for violations, and restrictive rules on collecting data. 140
The diminishment of user experience online is often cited by companies to
governments as the primary reason for not emulating California and Europe’s
privacy laws.141
It is highly ineffective for States to have different and conflicting privacy
regulations due to the interconnectedness of the internet, which is why a
federal law is necessary. It is unfair for consumers to receive different and,
therefore, disparate treatment concerning an inherent right such as data
privacy, based merely on their State residence. It is also unrealistic and overly
burdensome for companies to comply with various states’ individual laws.
Policymakers must take care that requirements do not create an unfair burden
on smaller-scale companies. To avoid such a burden, Congress should
consider tailoring new obligations based on the size and purpose of the
service in question.142 This article does not propose threshold requirements,
but it is important to note that they are necessary and should be carefully
selected.
4. International Regulation
The European Union’s General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) went
into effect in May 2018.143 It is far-reaching: applying to any company
regardless of the company’s location, extending to all those that process the
personal data of subjects residing in the European Union.144 The implications
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are thus massive, felt even in the U.S.145 Businesses have been implementing
the requirements of the GDPR to avoid a potentially large penalty, which can
be a fine of up to four percent of annual global turnover or twenty-million
euros, whichever is greater.146 Included in the GDPR are strong consent and
opt-in requirements for the processing of personal data.147 For example,
under Article 7 of the GDPR, controllers may only process personal data if
the data subject unambiguously consents—and the burden of proof is on
controllers.148
The U.S. should follow this model. Many companies in the U.S. have
already had to alter their practices and implement changes to comply with the
GDPR, creating a convenient opportunity for action within the U.S. 149
Because many companies within the U.S. have already implemented the
changes,

the

argument

implementation is weakened.

surrounding

hardships

associated

with

150

Furthermore, Article 17 of the GDPR includes a right for consumers to
exercise erasure of personal data concerning them without undue delay. 151
The GDPR has created an environment where marketers need to incentivize
consumers to share their data by hampering the default preset of automatic
data collection.152 The GDPR aims “to protect consumers’ privacy and
provide greater control over how their data is collected and used, moreover,
the Regulation requires marketers to secure explicit permission for data-use
activities within the E.U.”153
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III. BETTER PRACTICES
A. Why Opt-In is better than Opt-Out
Black’s Law Dictionary defines opt-in as follows: “to choose to participate
in something, thus signaling a right of control by an individual.” 154 In the
current scheme of online interactions between consumers and platforms,
notice and choice are foundational principles around which regulation of
privacy online has been built. For this reason, consumers encounter dozens
of lengthy privacy policies each day. The use of extensive privacy policies as
adequate notice for consumers to then make a “choice” about their personal
data is built upon a rational choice theory that assumes that individuals can
assess the costs and benefits of giving up control over their personal
information.155 However, this assumption is irrational in today’s digital era
where consumers are bombarded with lengthy privacy policies filled with
complicated language, which are ignored and, consequently, because of our
inaction, accepted. Notice by means of privacy policies could “only function
in a world where there was no scarcity of consumer time and attention,” and
meaningful choice is only possible where data collection is not the default
rule.156
A federal data privacy law should be passed that includes mandatory optin consent to replace the current opt-out process because opt-in is an
affirmative step that signals consent more clearly. Opt-out, by contrast,
creates a default rule of consent unless the consumer takes a proactive step
to say otherwise, which puts the burden on the less sophisticated party. The
way in which the system currently functions “encourages businesses to
inflate strategic-behavior costs to increase their own gains, albeit at the
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expense of consumers and the total surplus from the exchange.” 157
Furthermore, default rules create a precedent, in which it is less likely that
consumers’ true intentions are being communicated and respected according
to their preferences.158 An opt-in system creates a sense of entitlement, which
a consumer certainly should feel.159 For example, while explaining the move
to an opt-in standard for financial privacy in Vermont, the Banking
Commissioner made precisely such an argument, that “instead of waiving
their right to privacy by inaction, Vermonters will be protected until they
knowingly agree to the sharing of their personal information.” 160
A study found that seventy-five percent of consumers believe that when a
website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share their information
with other websites and companies.161 This evidence points to
misconceptions that most consumers have about online privacy. Due to
consumers’ lack of understanding about the process and system in which
their data is being collected and shared, strong consumer protection
regulation is necessary. Website and mobile app privacy policies are
strategically and knowingly “long, dense, and designed to be as unobtrusive
as possible.”162 Data collectors are thus operating by relying on consumers’
distorted perceptions about how their personal data is tracked and collected
online. In typical commercial settings, silence does not generally operate as
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an acceptance of an offer.163 An opt-in process is the right move towards
informed consumer consent with respect to data collection.
Default rules have substantial consequences and should be constructed to
place power in the less sophisticated party or at least retain the power that an
individual has by virtue of being an individual. Operating under an opt-out
system keeps the burden on the less informed party, and benefits the party
with superior knowledge.164 “If the default rule is that inaction equals loss of
privacy, then consumers are likely to surrender their privacy in a way that
does not reflect their actual preferences.”165 In modern society, time and
attention are scarce resources for consumers; and generally, default decisions
have been created to reflect these values.166
Research has shown that users rarely change pre-selected settings.167 In
many cases, both Facebook and Google have set the least privacy-friendly
choice as the default.168 The design and language used in Facebook’s privacy
controls have been found to nudge people toward sharing the maximum
amount of data with the company.169 Due to the significant disparity in the
bargaining power between the consumer and data collectors, affirmative
steps must be taken to give more power to consumers; the default rule of optout does the exact opposite. As companies with some of the largest
collections of consumer data expand into more industries, such as Google’s
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creation of its heath division170 or Big Tech’s expansion into financial
institutions, sensitive consumer data is even more at risk and should not be
subject to automatic data collection as the default. These companies have the
potential to use their troves of data to increase their expansion in these spaces
rapidly.
Reasonable limits should nevertheless also exist on the opt-in consent
system to ensure it does not become overly burdensome or inefficient for the
consumer. For example, opt-in consent might not be required for a service to
take steps that the user has requested, like collect a user’s mailing address
from shipping them the package they ordered.171 However, even in situations
where an affirmative opt-in is not required, the service should always give
the user clear notice of the data collection and use.172 This is especially true
when the proposed method is not part of the transaction, “like renting the
shipping address for junk mail.”173
Sophisticated technology, coupled with confusing legalese, creates a
situation where individuals are severely outmatched.174 Pam Dixon,
executive director of the World Privacy Forum, stated, “the deck is
stacked…it takes an extraordinarily diligent consumer to make informed
privacy choices on Facebook.”175 Professor Woodrow Hartzog urges that
“privacy law should ask whether a particular design interferes with our
understanding of risk or exploits our vulnerabilities in unreasonable ways
with respect to our personal information.”176 The overwhelming unequal
170
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bargaining power between the parties, stemming from consumers’
unawareness of data collection and sharing practices, is precisely why the
law must provide special safeguards to protect consumers.
B. Standardized Email
This article proposes a second layer of protection via a standardized email
that is sent after a consumer opts-in. Specifically, the standardized email
should clearly list all information that has been collected and stored about the
user and describe it in easy-to-understand terms, and delineate how and what
the data will be used for, ideally serving to put the consumer on meaningful
notice. Within the standardized email requirement, it should be mandatory
that a link exists that enables the user to exercise a “right to be forgotten,”
based on that in the E.U.’s GDPR, at any time. The email enables a consumer
to more easily reference the “contracts” that they enter into with providers to
share their data. As is, even when a consumer is asked for affirmative
consent, there are few traces of the relationship they just entered with the
provider whose box the consumer ticked. A fundamental flaw exists without
this email: a user who agrees with contract terms by ticking a box never
receives a copy of the relationship terms. Thus, consumers are subject to a
transactional relationship that they may not even be able to reference later.
The follow-up email is valuable as a means of record collection so that
consumers can retain the consent they have given. Users are continually
engaging with online platforms, and are unlikely to remember the sites and
companies they have allowed to collect and share their data. It is important
for consumers to have a record of the “transactions” that they have entered
into. In light of the massive security breaches, the FTC has filed complaints,
and made public announcements of bad practices, stating consumers need to
be able to check whether they have shared information with a specific
platform.
Additionally, the email requirement will, therefore, work to increase
transparency about precisely what information the consumer has shared and
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how it will be used. The consumer will be on notice and alerted by the email
in a more meaningful way because it will contain their shared information
for the consumer to see. Additionally, the email will make it possible for
consumers to maintain records and monitor with whom they opted into
sharing information and for what purpose. This creates increased
transparency in a currently invisible and disappearing transaction in which
personal data is shared.
Ideally, consumers will spend time actually looking over privacy terms
when they are put forth in simpler terms and their personal information is
clearly displayed with the notice that it has been shared and stored with others
as well. The email requirement serves as a reminder to consumers to take
control and understand the use of their data.
The standardized email is positive for businesses too. It will create a space
for companies to compete in the domain of consumer privacy because this
requirement will provide for a more simplified means to compare the data
collection policies of the various businesses that the consumer has elected to
opt-in and share information with. This may incentivize data collectors to
conform to consumer-friendly norms across the spectrum because, ideally,
the standardized email will assist consumers in becoming more
knowledgeable about data collection practices and recognizing egregious
terms and practices. Ultimately, the mandatory standardized email should
incentivize companies, which are competing with one another, to adopt
higher, more sensitive best practices for consumers in regard to data
collection and sharing. Additionally, data collectors should see the
standardized email as an extra layer of protection for themselves as well, as
evidence shows that businesses that neither tell customers how they use their
data nor offer any control are at greater risk of financial harm after a data
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breach.177 With more transparency, both sides of the transaction are more
protected.
1. Right to be Forgotten
The required “right to be forgotten” link within the email will give
consumers more control over their data and will give providers a process for
the consumer to change their mind about the consent they initially provided.
Consumers should feel in control of the data transaction at any stage, rather
than just at the beginning—since the asset is their personal information.
Article 17 of the GDPR states as follows:
(1) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the
controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without
undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase
personal data without undue delay where one of the following
grounds applies:
(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they were collected or otherwise
processed;
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the
processing is based… and where there is no other legal
ground for the processing…178
(2) Where the controller has made the personal data public and is
obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the
controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of
implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical
measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal
data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such
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controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal
data.179
Furthermore, the third paragraph states exceptions to the right to be forgotten
that are created in the above provisions; and of crucial importance is Article
17(3)(a), which creates an exception when the right to be forgotten comes in
conflict with “the right of freedom of expression.”180 In the case that the
lawful basis for processing is either a legitimate interest for the controller or
public interest, a balancing test is appropriate; the data controller will weigh
and balance the data controller’s legitimate interest or the public’s interest in
having access to the information versus the data subject’s fundamental right
to privacy.181 However, deletion is mandatory when the data subject requests
removal upon the legal basis of consent.182 The GDPR is an apt example of a
right to be forgotten that empowers consumers with protection while still
having restrictions and limitations that best serve the public interest.
Individuals’ ownership over their personal data should be continuous—the
right to be forgotten requires a shift in the current ideology that once control
over privacy is exchanged at the initial encounter of the relationship with a
business, it is from that point on lost to the consumer for future purposes. 183
Currently, even the California Consumer Protection Act, the most rigorous
data protection regulation in the U.S. does not have the same reach as the
E.U.’s right to be forgotten.184
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The proposal in this article incorporates the GDPR’s right to be forgotten
into the mandatory standardized email, which is required to be sent any time
consumer information is collected, stored, or shared. It is important to note
that exceptions to the right to be forgotten are needed—to allow for the free
flow of information, which is necessary to comply with the freedom of
individuals and the public at large. Congress should be careful when crafting
exceptions to the right to be forgotten in order to avoid challenges of
unconstitutionality. At the same time, exceptions must be narrowly tailored
to avoid loopholes that could sacrifice consumers’ right to be forgotten.
It is difficult for the average consumer at the time of data collection to
make a rational judgment about future privacy implications because the
implications are usually unknown at that time. 185 The right to be forgotten,
contained in email form, eliminates the burden of having to remember and
search every platform that a consumer interacts with in order to exercise
control. The option to be forgotten will be available in a consistent manner
throughout all platforms that collect, store, or share, consumer data. In
circumstances where a consumer is able to obtain the necessary information
needed to opt-out, the cost in time and money of communicating and
negotiating with the relevant information gatherers is substantial. 186 It is very
difficult to opt-out, if only because it is incredibly challenging to have a
recollection of the places where one had opted-in. Documenting all the
platforms to which the consumer has given consent for data collection will
create a log, which will make it more practical for a consumer to keep tabs
on and update preferences or exercise the right to be forgotten. This right
incentivizes companies to maintain rigorous controls and appropriate policies
because they do not want to lose the consent they once received from a
consumer. Additionally, the standardized form of the email remedies the
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issue of manufacturing designs purposefully or inadvertently making opt-out
difficult or hard to understand on some platforms.
A consumer may exercise the right to be forgotten at any time, which
empowers consumers with a sense of control over their data beyond just the
initial stage. In this way, “[a] right of exit prevents initial bad bargains from
having long-term consequences.”187 Studies show that “people are more
likely to opt-in if they feel they have the ability to change their mind and
refuse further use and transfers of personal information because then the
choice is not permanent.”188

IV. ENFORCEMENT
The Federal Trade Commission should assume the role of enforcement of
this legislation due to the Commission’s unparalleled experience in
protecting consumers in the market through its Bureau of Consumer
Protection and Bureau of Competition. The FTC has been at the forefront of
privacy enforcement, and is in the best position to carry out the enforcement
of a comprehensive privacy regulation in the U.S. Whether by examining
mergers and acquisitions to prevent harm to consumers, or by looking at
unfair and deceptive practices by businesses, the FTC is continually checking
on the market as its knowledge of privacy is the broadest in the U.S. 189 In
2006, the FTC started hiring technologists to advise its lawyers on new
technology.190 The FTC currently brings legal actions against organizations
that have violated consumers’ privacy rights by charging defendants with
violating the FTC Act, but it also enforces other federal laws relating to
consumer privacy and security.191 Some sectors are expressly exempt from
187
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Section Five of the FTC Act, meaning that the FTC cannot bring Section Five
actions

or

investigations

against

financial

institutions,

airlines,

telecommunications carriers, and others.192 Therefore, any legislation that is
passed should expressly grant enforcement authority to the FTC, so that the
Commission is not constrained by Section five. The statutes discussed above,
as well as others,193 all grant enforcement authority to the FTC.194
Further, a sweeping act such as this should bring more funding to the
Commission and thus incentivize it to expand its internet privacy division,
which seeks “to protect consumers’ personal information and ensure that
consumers have the confidence to take advantage of the many benefits of
products offered in the marketplace.”195 The FTC has played a significant
role in leading suits against giant corporations while allowing innovative
business practices. It is vital for an organization to be accountable for its data
processing activities. So the inclusion of a substantial penalty, enforceable
by the FTC, is absolutely necessary to make this type of regulation capable
of success.

V. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
Opponents of data privacy laws generally believe that self-regulation is the
best means for internet regulation. Though, the current climate of intrusive
data collection and devastating data breaches has proven otherwise. The CEO
of Apple, Tim Cook, has voiced his opinion in support of privacy regulation;
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“I’m a big believer in the free market, but we have to admit when the free
market is not working, and it hasn’t worked here.”196 Critics complain opt-in
requirements would create a costly burden on the business that exceeds the
value of consumers’ opting in.197 It is often the case that when changes to
consumer law are proposed, the estimated cost burdens are widely inflated.198
In the midst of growing consumer skepticism about data collection
practices, an opportunity to build consumer trust has presented itself.
Companies can build customer value by implementing a more transparent
process by which they collect data. When consumers are allowed to opt-in to
data collection and sharing, they are given a meaningful choice instead of a
default rule for sharing and collection. Businesses view consumer privacy as
a compliance obligation, which has led to missed opportunities for businesses
to recognize that the protection of personal information can be used to
differentiate a company from its competitors. 199 Businesses should consider
how information management practices can significantly affect brand
equality given the increased consumer focus on the protection of personal
information.200 A change to opt-in systems enables companies to continue to
collect data from willing consumers while also ensuring that their customers
have meaningfully consented to the risks of a future security breach when
they read the acknowledgment.
It is in the best interests of businesses to implement privacy policies that
provide consumers with transparency and control. One Harvard Business
Review study supports this claim, noting in particular that “a good corporate
privacy policy can shield firms from the financial harm posed by a data
196
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breach—by offering customers transparency and control over their personal
information.”201 Furthermore, the study’s research showed that sometimes
data breaches can create beneficial competitive effects.202 For instance,
following the massive Anthem data breach in 2015, rival Aetna gained about
$745 million on the day of the breach due to competitive effects. 203 As the
study goes on to show, companies that provide high levels of data
transparency and control would be protected from data breaches but also
would be shielded from spillover effects if a close competitor experienced a
data breach.204 Conversely, companies not providing high levels of
transparency and control are at risk not only if they suffer a breach, but also
if a competitor does.205 It is thus essential to all actors that companies
standing to make a profit from consumer data are required to inform
individuals about the unseen consumer data marketplace. Moreover, a
majority of companies have already implemented many of these processes in
their push to become compliant with the GDPR, so the burdens are lessened.
For many this change would merely mean an expansion of already
implemented procedures for E.U. consumers to U.S. consumers. Due to
GDPR implementation that has taken place over the past several years,
brands have an opportunity to reevaluate data practices, engage in better
communication to customers, demonstrate their commitment to their privacy
promises, and, thus, come out stronger on the other side.206
Second, critics argue that many data collection practices create better user
experiences for consumers, such as targeted advertisements, and data
collection has many beneficial attributes for technology innovation.207 Data
collection allows the advertisements we are shown on various platforms to
201
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be tailored to our interests.208 There are lots to be gained from this argument,
as advertising revenue is the chief revenue for many technology companies.
Google’s advertising revenue from 2019 was $134.8 billion dollars, 83.9
percent of Google’s total revenue.209
Although targeted advertisements are, for some, advantageous in many
ways, gaining this information through deceptive measures that most
consumers do not understand is not the proper way to do it. First, under an
opt-in system, consumers who like targeted ads can still make the meaningful
choice to share their data. This practice will not be eliminated; users will
always be able to balance and decide what is important to them. Further, that
argument “overlooks the ability of businesses to persuade consumers, an
ability that powers our current marketing environment.” 210 Indeed,
businesses have extraordinary capabilities to successfully market to their
ideal consumer bases, shown by businesses’ proclivity to thrive via more
traditional means before the era of targeted ads. An opt-in system gives
businesses an incentive to clearly explain to consumers, at the time of the
decision, the benefits and consequences of participation.211 This article thus
advocates that if, after given the information to make a decision, the
consumer understands what they are giving up and still decides against opting
in, the choice should simply be respected.212

VI. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the enactment of a robust federal privacy framework
that should preempt state law and put consumers in control of their online
identities. The recommendations made in this article do not suggest an end
to data collection. Of course, the businesses engaged in data collection are
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highly sophisticated and are very knowledgeable about the benefits of
consumer data. The hidden and mostly invisible nature of the consumer
personal data marketplace limits the potential for consumer action and
removes an incentive for companies to restrict their commercial use of such
information.213 It is irrational to think that consumers can adequately protect
their personal information and make meaningful choices regarding data
collection when they are mostly unaware of how companies use their data.214
The financial incentives and value associated with data collection and sharing
encourage businesses to design and employ platforms that achieve the most
optimal consumer data.215 By mandating rules regarding consumer consent,
requiring a record of the collection, and providing an easy-to-access option
to exercise the right to be forgotten, the highly imbalanced power dynamic
in the data transactions taking place every day is given some relief.
No single comprehensive privacy law exists in the U.S.; privacy rights
come from an assortment of sources—the U.S. Constitution, state
constitutions, federal and state statutes, and common law. 216 The final
objective is to establish a law that empowers consumers to have greater
participation and control over their personal data at all stages.
The proposals made in this article are intended to empower consumers by
requiring users be informed and have choices at the beginning, the middle,
and at the end of the transaction to allow companies to collect and share their
data. Through the instruments of mandatory opt-in consent, standardized
follow-up emails, and an easy-to-access right to be forgotten at any time,
consumers will be given more protection. The opt-in requirement will
eliminate the default rule of automatic data sharing and collection and will
place the burden on the appropriate party, the business who stands to profit
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for the sharing and collection. The requisite standardized email provides a
type of double-layer protection for the consumer as the more vulnerable and
less sophisticated party. The email also increases transparency regarding
information the consumer has shared and how this information will be used.
Additionally, the email will function in such a way that allows the consumer
to maintain records and monitor the actors with whom they opted into sharing
information, thus allowing them to check whether they had shared
information with that company in the event of security breaches or bad
practices that are announced after-the-fact. Finally, the email will contain a
link that allows users to opt-out and cease sharing information with the
company at any time.
As web services continue to grow in sophistication, so will their profits.
The current patchwork privacy regulation has failed consumers. While the
practice of data collection and sharing will continue and likely increase as
technology advances, the correct regulation would promote transparency and
give more control to consumers. A federal regulation is needed to set a
benchmark within the industry as it continues to grow exponentially. Ideally,
once consumers are given the correct tools to understand better and take
control of their data, they will be in an improved position to demonstrate their
actual market demands and desire.
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